The Lagos-Wright modela monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meetinghas been extensively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols. Here, trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings. It is shown that the rst-best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion without taxation if people are suciently patient. And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then lump-sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations. (100 words)
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However, such models give rise to an old question: how is trade determined in bilateral-monopoly situations? By far the most common approach is to assume one or several trading protocols; examples are alternating oers, take-it-or-leave-it oers, bargaining according to Nash, and posted prices.
Another approach, a kind of mechanism-design approach, explores all implementable outcomes. Here, we apply the implementability approach to the Wright, using a parameterized version of their model, nd that a 10% ination is equivalent to a 1.4% reduction in consumption under buyer take-itor-leave-it oers, as compared with a 3.2% reduction under Nash bargaining.
We provide a more robust analysis by, in eect, searching over all trading protocols that satisfy some properties. Second, the model has a crucial simplifying assumption: quasi-linear preferences in the centralized meeting.
That assumption, which is consistent with a degenerate steady-state distribution of money and accounts for the model's popularity, allows us to say a lot about the set of implementable outcomes.
We apply two notions of implementability to the model. One notion, called individually-rational (IR) implementability, requires only that trades in pairwise meetings be immune to individual defection; the other, called coalition-proof (CP) implementability, also requires that those trades be immune to cooperative defection by the pair in a meeting. 2 Earlier applications of IR implementability in monetary models include Kocherlakota (1998) . One application of CP implementability in monetary models is Deviatov (2006) , who studies optimal ination numerically.
the two notions, we prefer CP implementability because it is consistent with exhaustion of the gains from trade in meetings. We follow existing work by studying the model without and with lump-taxes levied in the centralized meeting and used to nance interest on money. The version with taxes can be used to study the role of the Friedman rule and the welfare costs of ination.
According to all the previously studied trading protocols in the LagosWright model, the rst-best allocation is not achievable without the use of lump-sum taxes. In contrast, we show that the rst-best is CP implementable without taxes when people are suciently patient. Previous expositions of the model also show that the rst-best is achievable if buyers make take-itor-leave-it oers and if there is lump-sum-tax nanced payment of interest on money at the Friedman-rule rate. We show that if preferences in the centralized meeting are linear, rather than quasi-linear, and people are free to skip the centralized meetingan implication of no-commitment by individuals that has been ignoredthen such a policy does not help; it does not enlarge even the set of IR implementable allocations. (Although we use linearity throughout, this is the only result that depends on it.) Finally, as noted above, previous studies show that the welfare cost of ination varies greatly with the trading protocol. We characterize the sets of IR and CP implementable allocations taking as given the ination rate. If we measure the welfare cost of ination by choosing the best CP implementable allocation subject to a given ination rate, then we nd an associated welfare cost, measured relative to the rst best, that is smaller than that found for any given trading protocol. Indeed, for the Lagos-Wright parameterized version, ination less than about 16% per year is costless.
The environment
Time is discrete, there are two stages at each date, preferences are additively separable over dates and stages, and there is a nonatomic unit measure of people who maximize expected discounted utility with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The rst stage has pairwise meetings and the second stage has a centralized meeting. Just prior to the rst stage, a person looks forward to be being a buyer who meets a seller with probability 1 N , looks forward to being a seller who meets a buyer with probability 1 N , and looks forward to no pairwise meeting with probability 1 − 2 N , where N ≥ 2. The stage-1 utility of someone who becomes a seller and produces y ∈ R + is −c(y), while that of someone who becomes a buyer and who consumes y is u(y), where c(0) = u(0) = 0, c and u are strictly increasing and continuous with c convex and u concave, and u − c is strictly concave. 3 Moreover, there exists y > 0 such that c(y) = u(y). There are special preferences for stage 2: the utility of consuming z amount of the stage-2 good is z. As in Lagos and Wright (2005) , z < 0 is interpreted as production.
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All goods are perishable (both across stages and time), people cannot commit to future actions, and there is no monitoring (histories are private information)assumptions that serve to make money essential. Money is divisible, in xed supply, and the per capita amount is normalized to be 1.
Finally, people can hide money and participation in the centralized meeting is voluntary, voluntariness that matters only when there are lump-sum taxes.
Stationary and symmetric allocations
All of our results are about allocations in which consumption and production are stationary and symmetric in the following way. An allocation is a pair (y, z) ∈ R 2 + , where y is stage-1 production and consumption in any buyerseller meeting and z is stage-2 production (consumption) in the centralized meeting of any person who consumed (produced) y at stage 1. Associated with such (y, z) is zero production and consumption at both stages by those who didn't meet anyone at stage 1.
We describe the set (y, z) that is IR implementable and the subset that is CP implementable. When judging the welfare of (y, z), our criterion is the payo implied by (y, z) prior to pairwise meetings; namely, h(y) ≡ u(y)−c(y) N (1−δ) .
(Because a person is as likely to produce z as to consume z and because stage 2 utility is linear, the magnitude of z does not appear in this expression.) The assumed strict concavity of u − c implies that arg max[u(y) − c(y)], denoted y * , is unique, and that h(y) is strictly increasing for y ∈ [0, y * ] and strictly decreasing for y ∈ [y * , ∞). Our assumptions also imply that y * > 0. 4 In Lagos and Wright (2005) , the authors assume quasi-linearity and a net gain from producing z and consuming z for some z. As noted above, only one of our results depends on our linearity assumption, as opposed to their quasi-linearity assumption.
Implementable allocations: zero taxes
Both of our notions of implementability are weak in the sense that when we say that an allocation is implementable we mean that there exists an equilibrium with that allocation as an outcome. We will not be demonstrating that any equilibrium gives that outcome. In addition, the equilibrium notion we use relies on anonymity. That is, each person in a pairwise meeting evaluates the consequences of current actions taking as given that the people each will meet in the future will have money holdings implied by equilibrium play.
We next describe two games: one for each notion of implementability.
Each game is dened relative to a (planner) proposal. We use M ⊂ R + to denote the set in which money holdings or money transfers reside; ι to denote the identity function on M; Y ⊂ R + to denote the set in which stage 1 output resides, and Z ⊂ R to denote the set in which stage-2 consumption resides. The IR-game. First, the buyer and seller simultaneously announce their money holdings. Second, they simultaneously choose from {yes, no}. If both say yes, then the trade given by the proposal is carried out; otherwise the meeting is autarkic.
Obviously, the second step insures that any trade that occurs is individually rational.
The CP-game. First, the buyer and seller simultaneously announce their money holdings. Second, they simultaneously choose from {yes, no}. If both say yes, then they go to the next step; otherwise the meeting is autarkic. Third, the buyer announces a trade and then the seller announces from {yes, no}. If the seller announces yes, then the buyer's proposed trade is carried out; otherwise, the trade in the (planner's) proposal is carried out.
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The second step in the CP game insures that each person has the option of autarky. If the third step is reached, then either the planner's proposal is carried out or a trade that Pareto dominates it is carried out. Therefore, if the planner's proposal is coalition proof for the pair, then it is carried out. In that case, there is no benet to the buyer in the third step from proposing.
If the planner's proposal is not coalition proof, then there is some benet, but it is constrained by the planner's proposal.
We focus on simple strategies in these games.
Denition 2 A strategy in the IR game consists of three functions, denoted proposed trade which is completely determined by the reported money holdings. In the CP-game, types also matter because they help determine the alternative trades that could be carried out.
In terms of the above notation, we have the following denition of an equilibrium.
Denition 4 An equilibrium of the IR (CP) game is a sequence (s includes ϕ 0 p , the initial condition. Condition (i) is a Nash-like feature, because checking whether a sequence satises it involves checking whether it holds for the value functions implied by the sequence. As written, condition (i) appeals to the one-date deviation principle which, as pointed out below, applies. Condition (ii) is standard and condition (iii) is feasibility at stage 2 without planner participation.
Throughout we work with a special kind of equilibrium.
Denition 5 A simple equilibrium is an equilibrium in which (i) the proposal has a degenerate initial distribution of money (each person has 1 unit); (ii) the strategy and belief sequences are constant sequences and imply ϕ t p = ϕ 0 p ; (iii) everyone is truthful, the planner's proposed trade is carried out, and yes is always played. An obvious consequence of this denition is that IR implementability is necessary for CP implementability. We also have the following necessary condition for IR implementability.
Lemma 1 If (y, z) is IR implementable, then the planner's proposal satises the following conditions: ϕ 0 p is degenerate, g(1, 1) = (y, 1), and p = z. Moreover, the implied value functions satisfy
Proof. By denition 6, there exists a simple equilibrium whose outcome is consistent with (y, z). If the corresponding proposal does not satisfy g(1, 1) = (y, 1), then it must satisfy g(1, 1) = (y, x), with x < 1. But any such trade in a simple equilibrium implies that people enter stage 1 with more money than they will spend, even if they are buyers. This violates optimal stage-2 choice at the previous date because linearity of stage-2 utility and discounting implies that any such person is better o entering stage 1 with only x amount of money and restoring money holdings at the next stage 2.
With g(1, 1) = (y, 1), only p = z is consistent with (y, z) and with persistence of the degenerate distribution of money. The value function claims are obvious.
Our most important results demonstrate implementability of some (y, z).
For such suciency-like results, the restriction to simple equilibria is without loss of generality. The crucial part of the proof for each such result is the construction of the (planner's) proposal. The on-equilibrium parts of the proposal are in lemma 1. That is, the seller produces y and the buyer transfers all money held. And at p = z, agents make choices that restore the degenerate distribution and, as a consequence, are feasible. The main eort in our suciency proofs is devoted to constructing g(·, 1) and g(1, ·), the o-equilibrium trades. For a simple equilibrium, we do not have to dene g on other parts of the domain. And for a simple equilibrium, beliefs are easy to specify. If a money holding equal to unity is announced, then Bayes rule applies and implies that the announcement is treated as truthful; if a money holding dierent from unity is announced, then any belief can be specied because Bayes rule does not apply. The main idea behind the construction of g(·, 1) is to punish the buyer with o-equilibrium money holdings.
Some of our results demonstrate that some (y, z) are not implementable.
For such necessity-type results, the restriction to simple equilibria may have bite. That is, for such results, we establish only that there is no simple equilibrium with an outcome consistent with (y, z). And we do that by describing some feasible defections from a simple equilibrium.
5 Results: zero taxes Most of our results can be stated in terms of the set,
where
Because welfare depends only on y, it is useful to describe the projection of V on y; namely, the interval [0, y max ], where y max is the unique positive solution for y to c(y) = Ru(y unit of money assures a payo no less than w c (1), while following g(1, 1) = (y, 1) gives the seller −c(y) + w c (2). Thus, it must be the case that
where the equality follows from (1) (see lemma 1). This is the rst inequality that denes V . Next, consider an agent who enters stage 2 with 0 money. By lemma 1, this agent's payo is −z + δw p (1). However, it is feasible for this agent to produce 0 at stage 2 and resume feasible equilibrium actions starting at the next date. This possibility and IR implementability give the inequality
where the righthand side is the payo from the above defection. But, by lemma 1, this inequality is equivalent to
Using the denition of h(y), this is easily seen to be the second inequality that denes V .
Suciency. Our candidate for completion of the planner's proposal is g(1, m) = (y, 1) for all m and g(m, 
and
To complete the proof, we have to show that these induce truth-telling and playing yes at stage 1 and induce the proposed stage-2 strategy.
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Given g in (7), truthfulness is a weakly dominant strategy for everyone. Now we show that a buyer with m ≥ 1 says yes and that any seller says yes. 8 This is where we use the principle of one-period deviations. To invoke it, we have to show that corresponding to any benecial deviation is a nite-period deviation. This holds provided that period payos for a defector not grow too fast. In our case, period payos in pairwise meetings are bounded above by u(y max ). As for period payos in the centralized meeting, they can grow at most arithmetically, by z per date. These imply that corresponding to any benecial deviation is a nite-period deviation. Given the nite-period deviation, the one-period deviation principle follows by backward induction. , where, for simplicity, we denote s c (m) by x. Because this amount is less than 1, the payo according to (9) is
This expression is linear in x and increasing. Therefore, consistent with not carrying money that is not spent at stage 1, this person chooses x = zm (zero money). Then the above expression is
We have to show that this is weakly dominated by the payo from choosing s c (m) = z(m − 1), which according to (8) is z(m − 1) + δh(y). The required inequality is equivalent to
which, in turn, is equivalent to inequality (6). But, as noted above, inequality (6) is equivalent to the second inequality that denes V . 
Such exists because y > y * . It follows that there exists η > 0 such that
Then
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that the buyer can buy 1 unit of money in the centralized meeting, the second inequality from the second inequality in (11), and the equality from (1). Following the same logic, we
Therefore, by (12) and (13) the oer (y − , 1 − η) Pareto dominates (y, 1), the planner's proposal, a contradiction.
Suciency. Consider anyỹ ∈ (0, min {y max , y * }] and letz be such that (ỹ,z) ∈ V . Our candidate for the completion of the planner's proposal is g(m, m ) = arg max
where I is the indicator function. The constraint set in this problem is not empty and the solution exists and is unique; moreover, the displayed constraint holds at equality at the solution. (Notice that the problem has the form of a Pareto problem and that the period return to a buyer with m = 1, a defector, is minimized subject to a lower bound. The lower bound for m ≥ 1 is that implied by an output trade equal toỹ, and a transfer of 1 unit of money from the buyer to the seller; the lower bound for m < 1 is that implied by no trade. The objective is the period return of the seller.)
We rst show that g(1, m ) = (ỹ, 1). If x = 1, then constraint (14) at equality implies y =ỹ. Otherwise, the constraint on the trade of money is not binding. Then, after substitutingzx from (14) at equality into the objective, we see that y is chosen to maximize u(y) − c(y). Hence, y = y * . But, becauseỹ ≤ y * and x < 1, this means that constraint (14) is slack, and then the value of the objective can be increased by increasing x, a contradiction. Thus g(1, m ) = (ỹ, 1).
Next, we propose equilibrium strategies and beliefs. The stage-1 strategies are dictated by the requirements of a simple equilibrium: agents are truthful, they say yes to any proposal, and the buyer proposes the planner's proposal. The strategy in the centralized meeting, s c , is such that any agent leaves with 1 unit of money. For beliefs, we assume that reports are believed. Notice that Bayes rule only applies to reports that say that 1 unit of money is held.
Given the proposals and the strategies, we can calculate the value functions. It follows that w c (m) is given by (8) and that w p (m) is given by (9) , where the latter is a consequence of the binding constraint in the problem that denes g. (That is, without knowing the trades that solve the above problem for m = 1, the binding constraint gives us the payos needed to specify the value functions, which are those in the proof of proposition 1.)
Now we conrm that the strategies are optimal.
9 Because s c and the value functions are those in Proposition 1, it follows from the proof of that proposition that s c is optimal. As regards the strategies for pairwise meetings, if both agents are truthful and say yes, then the planner's proposal is an optimal proposal by the buyer because of the Pareto form of the problem that denes g and the lower bound in (14). And, because the value functions are those of Proposition 1, it is optimal for both agents to say yes. It remains to show that agents tell the truth.
Consider rst a buyer with m ≥ 1 who makes an announcement m < m and with respective solutions (y , x ) and (y, x). Also, let ∆ = m − m. If m ≥ 1, then the payo to misrepresentation is
where the rst and third equalities follow from the fact that w c is ane, and the second and fourth from constraint (14) at equality. If, instead, m < 1, 9 Again, the principle of one-period deviations can be invoked (see the last footnote).
then the payo to misrepresentation is
where the equalities follow from (14) at equality, and the inequality follows from the second inequality that denes V . Next, consider a buyer with m < 1. Then the payo to misrepresentation
where both equalities follow from (14) at equality. This characterization implies our claim that if people are suciently patient, then the rst best is CP implementable. If they are, then as noted above y * ≤ y max , and we can CP implement y * .
It may seem surprising that we can implement more allocations than can be achieved under generalized Nash bargaining. In a static model, the set of all such generalized Nash bargaining outcomes is the set of coalition-proof allocations taking as given the agent endowments. Here, we can choose how to divide the gains from trade as a function of the endowments, the money holdings brought into the meeting. That additional freedom allows us to implement more stationary allocations.
10
As we claimed, all of the above results carry over to the version with quasilinear stage-2 preferences, provided that they are consistent with a degenerate distribution of money. If they are, then quasi-linear stage-2 preferences imply an ane w c function that diers from the one above only by having a dierent constanta constant that plays no role in any of the arguments above.
Finally, it is evident from our proofs that the ability of agents to hide money does not restrict the set of IR or CP implementable allocations. For CP implementability, this is due to the linearity (or quasi-linearity) of stage-2 preferences, as can be seen in the proof of proposition 2. We should not expect the same results to hold in more general models. , where m = m Mt . The nonnormalized price of money at t, denoted p t , satises p t = p (1+τ ) t . Therefore, the rate of return on money is p t+1 p t
. The Friedman-rule is τ = δ − 1. In order to avoid the well-known indeterminacy at the Friedman rule, we study τ > δ − 1.
We begin with necessary conditions for IR implementability, the analogue of lemma 1. Proof. As in the proof of lemma 1, there is a simple IR equilibrium consistent with (y, z). The bound on τ implies that excess money is not carried from one stage 2 to the next stage 2. That implies g (1, 1) = (y, 1) , which, in turn, implies that money holdings are in the set {0, 1, 2} at the 11 Since rst formulating the material in this section, we have come across Andolfatto (2008), which also departs from mandatory taxation. beginning of stage 2. And, in order that consumption at stage 2 be consistent with the allocation (y, z) and that each person leave stage 2 with 1 unit of money, we must have
Lemma 2 If
It follows that p = (1 + τ )z. The value-function conclusions in (15) follow.
Although this result does not cover the Friedman-rule rate-of-return, that
is not a concern. The usual treatment of that case is to select the g(1, 1) = (y, 1) simple equilibrium from among many such equilibria for that case.
Given that selection, our proof extends to the Friedman-rule rate-of-return.
Because the games have to be amended in slightly dierent ways for the deation and ination cases, we study those cases separately.
Deation
In this case, we present one result: if (y, z) is IR implementable with deation, then it is IR implementable with no deation, with τ = 0. This result and proposition 2 imply that deation is useless. Because the result pertains to IR implementability, we here describe only how to amend that denition to permit consideration of a tax.
Planner proposal: a fourth object, τ ∈ R − , is added to what constitutes a planner's proposal in denition 1.
IR game: The part of the game for stage 1 is unchanged. At the conclusion of stage 1, each person chooses from {yes, no}, where yes means proceeding to stage 2, the centralized meeting, and no means skipping it. If yes is played, then the person is subject to the taxes implied by τ and, as in the no-tax game, chooses a budget-feasible trade at the price in the planner proposal.
It may seem odd to tie paying the lump-sum tax to receiving a return on money. After all, if there were actual deation, then a person could conceivably not pay the lump-sum tax, but still receive the return on money implied by deation. However, that kind of defection, which we do not permit, would only further restrict what can be implemented.
IR strategy. This is unchanged except that we replace s tion choice) and s t c2 is dened as was s t c with the budget implied by the tax scheme.
The denitions of equilibrium, simple equilibrium, and IR implementability are not aected. Now we can prove that deation does not help.
Proposition 3 If
Proof. Suppose that (y, z) is IR implementable. Someone who enters a pairwise meeting without money has the following option: with probability 1/N produce, acquire a unit of money, and enter the centralized meeting; otherwise skip the centralized meeting. Therefore,
or, equivalently,
where the equality uses (15) (see lemma 2). But for IR implementability, the payo for someone who enters stage 2 without money and participates in the centralized meeting, w c (0) as given by (15), must exceed that implied by skipping the centralized meeting, δw p (0). By (17) , that requires
This is easily seen to be equivalent to the second inequality that denes V . And, because a seller with 1 unit of money in a pairwise meeting has no trade as an option, we require −c(y) + w c (2) ≥ w c (1). According to (15), this is the rst inequality that denes V .
In principle, deation can be benecial because it transfers resources from those without money to those who have moneythat is, from people who were consumers in pairwise meetings to people who were producers. When participation constraints are binding, in the sense that y * > y max , everyone would be willing to commit to y * before going to pairwise meetings, if commitment were possible. But this means taking a gamble that involves a net loss for someone who turns out to be a producer, and a gain for someone who is a consumer, such that the expected gain outweighs the expected loss. When commitment is not possible, the producer would balk, because c(y * ) < Ru(y * ), and the highest feasible output is then y max , with c (y max ) = z = Ru (y max ). If it were possible to enhance the value of money in such a way as to retrieve some of the consumer's gain in the pairwise meeting and transfer it to the producer, then the participation constraint could be relaxed. But when this constraint is binding, the consumer is indierent between skipping the centralized meeting and exchanging z for a unit of money in that meeting. Thus, any scheme that taxes the consumer for participation in the centralized meeting is not feasible unless the tax can be made mandatory. Indeed, no mattter what form of taxation might be used, any such scheme implies some value of zto be produced by those who were consumers in pairwise meetings and to be consumed by those who were producers. Thus, the value functions are those given by Lemma 2, and Proposition 3 applies. Therefore, when y * > y max , there is no feasible intervention such that y > y max unless participation in the centralized meeting is mandatory.
Because we tie avoiding the tax to skipping the centralized meeting, Proposition 3 uses linearity of preferences in the centralized meeting, rather than quasi-linearity, in an essential way. But quasi-linearity does not, of course, justify making the tax mandatory. Instead, it requires a more detailed formulation of tax enforcement and how it is related to other activities in the centralized meeting.
Ination
It is also standard to use versions of the Lagos-Wright model to provide a positive analysis of the welfare costs of ination. In order to have our tax transfer scheme for τ > 0 correspond to ination, which holders of money cannot avoid (except by holding less money), we here make stage-2 participation mandatory, in the sense that any money held by someone who skips the centralized meeting becomes worthless. With that innocuous change, our formulation is equivalent to the usual formulation with ination.
To use the model to study the welfare eects of ination, we characterize the set of IR and CP implementable allocations taking τ ∈ R + as given. As we will see, the lump-sum transfer tends to reduce the set of IR implementable allocations because it tempts people to leave the centralized meeting without money in order to avoid the ination tax.
We show that for τ > 0, the set of IR implementable allocations is
Notice that (y, z) ∈ V (τ ) if and only if y ∈ [0, y max (τ )], where y max (τ ) is the unique positive solution for y to c(y) = R(τ )u(y), with R(0) = R and y max (0) = y max in terms of the notation used above. Clearly, R(τ ) is strictly decreasing in τ and R(τ ) → 0 as τ → ∞. It follows that y max (τ ) is strictly decreasing in τ and that y max (τ ) → 0 as τ → ∞. After we prove the claim about IR implementable allocations, conclusions about CP implementable allocations will follow immediately from the argument used to prove Proposition 2.
The proof of the next proposition is almost identical to that of proposition Proof. Necessity. At stage 1, defection to no-trade by a seller with 1 unit of money assures a payo no less than w c (1), while following g(1, 1) = (y, 1) gives the seller −c(y) + w c (2). Thus, it must be the case that
where the equality follows from (15) (see lemma 2). This is the rst inequality that denes V (τ ). Next, consider an agent who enters stage 2 with 0 money. A feasible alternative to w c (0) is to leave stage 2 without money and to resume feasible equilibrium actions starting at the next date. That such a deviation not be undertaken requires
where the left side is the no-deviation payo and the right side is the deviation payo including the payo from consuming the value of the lump-sum transfer, pτ 1+τ
= zτ . By (15), (22) is equivalent to
Using the denition of h(y), it is easily seen that this is the second inequality that denes V (τ ).
Suciency. Our candidates for g(1, m) and g(m, 1) are the same as in the proof of proposition 1 (see (7)). And, again, we propose that an equilibrium strategy has s c (m) (consumption at stage 2) such that each person leaves stage 2 with 1 unit of money. If the above trades are carried out, then the initial degenerate distribution persists and the implied value functions are given by the expressions in the proof of proposition 1 (see (8) and (9)).
To complete the proof, we have to show that these induce truth-telling and playing yes at stage 1 and also induce the proposed stage-2 strategy. Given g in (7), truthfulness is a weakly dominant strategy for everyone. Now we show that a buyer with m ≥ 1 says yes and that any seller says yes. According to (9) , the implied payo is
We have to show that this is weakly dominated by the payo from choosing s c (m) = z(m − 1), which according to (9) The proof of the corollary follows exactly the logic of the proof of proposition 2 except that y max (τ ) replaces y max . With this corollary in hand, we can describe the implied welfare cost of ination and how that cost compares to those for given trading protocols.
In this model, it is reasonable to measure the welfare cost of ination by some increasing function of y * * − y, where y * * = min {y * , y max (0)} and y is stage 1 output. If y is chosen optimally from the CP implementable set, then y = min{y * , y max (τ )} and the welfare cost of ination is determined by y * * − min{y * , y max (τ )}.
12 All the trading protocols that have been studied
give rise to IR implementable allocations and to y < y * * . It follows that the implied stage-1 output found for a given trading protocol satises y ≤ min{y * , y max (τ )}. Therefore, as should be no surprise, the welfare cost we nd is no greater than that found for any given protocol.
Lagos and Wright argue that if the ination rate is slightly above the Friedman-rule rate, and if the trading protocol is that buyers make take-itor-leave-it oers to sellers, then the cost of ination is small, by the envelope theorem. Our result is quite dierent (and it has nothing to do with the Friedman-rule). First, if y * * = y * , then ination has no cost, up to the point where y * = y max (τ ). Second, if y * * = y max (0), meaning that the rst-best level of output cannot be achieved because the seller's participation constraint is binding, then ination has a rst-order cost, because it exacerbates this constraint.
12 If there were a revenue need that could only be met through ination, then the planner would want to choose the best CP implementable allocation. . In the case of the Nash bargaining protocol, Lagos and Wright obtain y = .442 when the ination rate is zero, and y = .143 when the ination rate is 10%, implying a large welfare cost. But for these parameter values we have y max (0.1) = 1.41, so that the rst-best allocation is in the CP implementable set; in fact the welfare cost is zero for ination rates below 16.7%.
Concluding remarks
Our results imply that entire classes of trading protocols that have been studied are missing good coalition-proof implementable allocations. There is no reason to think that that result is limited to the Lagos-Wright model. 
